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Abstract
Aggregators are facing increased scrutiny by regulatory authorities, suggesting these
sites have considerable market power. On the other extreme, rms are bypassing ag-
gregators, choosing instead to sell directly to consumers. This raises the question as to
which party has more market power: the aggregator or the individual rm. Focusing
on the airline industry, we investigate who benets the most in the airline-aggregator
relationship. Specically, we ask what would happen to airline and aggregator site
visits and purchases in the absence of a comprehensive aggregator. We rst explore
consumers' search patterns on Southwest, an airline that has never been part of any
aggregator. In a descriptive exercise, we nd that consumers who book on Southwest
are the least likely to visit aggregator sites. Second, we use the 2011 American dis-
pute with Orbitz as an exogenous event, which led to American fares no longer being
displayed on Orbitz for ve months. We use this dispute to identify who was hurt the
most { the aggregator or the airline - in the months following the dispute. Our ndings
indicate the aggregator loses the most when it is not comprehensive.
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1 Introduction
Search aggregators, such as Google, Kayak, and Expedia, improve consumers' search experi-
ence by providing a quick and comprehensive view of all available options, resulting in better
matches between consumers and products. Aggregators also help consumers discover new or
unfamiliar products (e.g., a niche hotel, a new airline route). However, aggregators are facing
increased scrutiny by regulatory authorities who fear that many rms are at the mercy of
aggregators and their ranking algorithms1. If aggregators have more market power, a rm
that is not part of an aggregator risks not being discovered by consumers. On the other
extreme, many rms are bypassing aggregators completely, choosing instead to sell directly
to consumers. This behavior might arise if rms have more market power and prefer to
not be part of an aggregator that makes price comparison easy, increasing price competition
and eroding brand value. Who has the upper hand in the rm-aggregator relationship is an
increasingly relevant question for regulatory authorities.
Focusing on the airline industry, this paper investigates who benets the most in the
airline-aggregator relationship. Although aggregators help airlines by enabling consumers to
nd their best match, aggregators need the presence of more airlines to be comprehensive
and hence useful to consumers. With airlines questioning the value of search aggregators,
we ask what would happen to airline and aggregator site visits and purchases in the absence
of a comprehensive aggregator. Enabled by digital technology, airlines are beginning to
bypass online ticket aggregators and global distribution systems, preferring to sell directly
to consumers. For example, Southwest sells its tickets only on southwest.com and is not
available for purchase on any ight aggregator. Disputes between aggregators and airlines
over fees have also been on the rise: American pulled its listings from Orbitz in 2011 following
a dispute over distribution fees on ight-reservation systems; Delta, in 2013, delisted its ights
from several online travel websites.
Using detailed browsing data from comScore, we rst document that most consumers use
aggregators before making a nal purchase at an airline's website. Southwest, which sells
tickets only directly through its website, sees an exception to this general behavior: its users
are the least likely to visit aggregators. We also document that loyalty to airlines is more
common than to aggregators: nearly 52% of users browse only one airline, while most users
use multiple aggregators in their searches.
We next turn to identifying a causal link between aggregator search and airline visits. To
do so, we take advantage of a dispute between American airlines and Orbitz surrounding the
1For example, the EU commission is drafting regulation aimed at increasing transparency as to how search
engines, e-commerce sites, and app stores rank their results and why they delist some services (Reuters 2018).
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payment of distribution fees. Because of this dispute, American tickets were not displayed
on Orbitz for nearly 5 months from December 21, 2010 - June 2, 2011. The dispute created
a clear shift in the choice set available to consumers visiting Orbitz, with the timing being
driven entirely by the contract renegotiation deadline, thus creating a quasi-experimental
setting. Expedia delisted American's ights for a shorter 3 month period from January 1,
2011-April 5, 2011. A Time (2011) article reported, \In bypassing the online travel agents,
American saves on distribution costs, but can also raise its ticket prices more easily, since its
fares won't be displayed directly beside those of its competitors."
We nd that during the dispute period, the aggregator was negatively impacted in both
its site visits and purchases. Site visits at Orbitz and Expedia dropped by nearly 10% and
purchases by 2%. On the other hand, American did not experience a signicant change
in its site visits or purchases. Moreover, we nd that consumers living near airports where
American is the most important airline continued to use Orbitz and Expedia, perhaps because
they knew about American's oerings and used Orbitz and Expedia to learn about other
competing oerings. However, consumers near airports where another airline (e.g., United) is
the most important, and American is present, were more likely to leave Orbitz and Expedia
during the dispute period, likely because without American's information, these sites were
not as useful. This dimension of consumer heterogeneity suggests that when an aggregator
is not comprehensive, its usefulness drops.
Next, we test two main predictions suggested by the theoretical and empirical literature
related to the degree of manufacturer competition and customer loyalty. On competition, the
literature suggests manufacturer competition should make for higher retailer market power
(O'Brien and Shaer 1997, Kadiyali et al 2000). Utilizing the variation in the localized nature
of airline competition across airports, we nd empirical support for this theory. On loyalty,
the literature suggests loyalty to the manufacturer can relieve competition thus giving the
manufacturer more power. Ailawadi et al (2010) highlight the theoretical work around this.
Correspondingly, we expect loyalty to retailers gives the retailer more power. We indeed nd
the biggest decline in usage of Orbitz and Expedia is among users who are least loyal, i.e.,
who use multiple aggregators. This analysis provides further evidence of aggregators' limited
market power in this industry.
We also investigate supply side responses such as pricing and advertising changes dur-
ing the dispute period. We nd some evidence suggesting competing aggregators such as
Priceline might have increased their Internet ad expenditure. We therefore further control
for ad expenditure in our demand regressions, and nd that our results are robust. The
possibility that competitors might respond further highlights the need for the aggregator to
be comprehensive and the dependence of the aggregator on the rm.
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Our results have implications for regulatory authorities and policy makers, and suggest
aggregators and search engines do not necessarily always have substantial market power.
The relationship between rms and aggregators can be industry-specic and needs to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In our setting, where there are multiple aggregators which
users can easily substitute between and relatively few airlines, we nd the aggregator does
not have much market power.
1.1 Contribution
Closely related to the incentives at work in this industry, Baye and Morgan (2001) theoreti-
cally show that in a homogeneous product market, an aggregator has incentives to gain full
consumer participation but keep rm participation partial. This is because when all rms
participate, prices drop to marginal costs, removing incentives for the rm to pay a fee to
the aggregator or for the consumer to use the aggregator's site. The gatekeeper would rather
have some rms not participate to encourage price dispersion. This perhaps can explain why
Southwest is not part of an aggregator and advertises itself as a \low-cost" carrier. This can
also explain why the disputes lasted only a few months and did not lead to a new equilibrium
with airlines permanently absent from aggregators. Our goal is to empirically identify who
benets the most in the airline-aggregator relationship and identify how consumers react to
the absence of a prominent airline from an aggregator.
The importance of aggregators has been empirically analyzed in the news industry (Athey
et al. 2016, Chiou and Tucker 2017, Calzada and Gil 2016), where similar disputes have
arisen between aggregators and news outlets. However, whereas news aggregators can act as
complete substitutes to news outlets threatening the outlets' revenue stream, in our setting,
the aggregator merely serves as an additional channel, with airlines still earning most of the
revenue.
Closely related to this paper, Biltokach, Rupp and Pai (2017) use the American-Orbitz
dispute to examine resulting airline fare and demand changes. In contrast, our paper focuses
on the impact of the dispute on aggregators to understand who has more market power:
airlines or aggregators. Our paper adds to their work by examining detailed browsing-level
data to understand consumers' visitation behavior prior to purchase. We also utilize the
variation in the degree of airline competition at various airports as well as individual-level
dierences in loyalty towards aggregators to examine heterogenous treatment eects and test
various theoretical predictions.
Beyond online domains, aggregators are ubiquitous in the retail channel. The question
of who has more market power in the retailer-manufacturer relationship has received a lot
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of empirical attention in the marketing literature. Ailawadi et al. (2010), in their review
paper, highlight the divergent results reported in empirical work. For example, Villas-Boas
and Zhao 2005; Draganska et al. 2010 nd evidence of manufacturer power while Kadiyali
et al. (2000) nd evidence of retailer power. In most of these settings, researchers do not ob-
serve wholesale prices and/or marginal costs, which makes inference rely on certain modeling
assumptions, e.g., assuming a specic competitive structure such as monopolistic retailers.
Even when wholesale prices and markups are observed, the counterfactual bargaining out-
come is not observed, i.e., what would happen were the manufacturer not present in the
retailer's assortment? Therefore, one cannot separately distinguish between manufacturers
strong bargaining skills and retailers poor outside options (Noton and Elberg 2018 elaborate
on this). One needs to observe entry/exit of manufacturers and episodes of disagreements
between the retailer and manufacturer to rightly infer who has more power. We contribute
to this literature by providing a setting to infer market power using the exogenous exit of an
airline (manufacturer) from an aggregator (retailer) for a nite amount of time.
2 Institutional Details
Understanding the reason for the disputes between airlines and aggregators requires an un-
derstanding of the way tickets are distributed and the various revenue models in place.
Revenue sources of OTAs and meta-search sites
Airline search aggregators consist of online travel agencies (OTAs) such as Orbitz and Ex-
pedia, and meta-search sites such as Kayak. When a consumer purchases a ticket from an
OTA, the OTA earns a commission from the airline. If a consumer uses an OTA to nd her
best match and then goes on to the airline website to buy her ticket, the OTA does not get
paid. Meta-search sites, on the other hand, earn revenues through referral fees from directing
consumers to the airline's website, irrespective of whether a purchase is made.
Both OTAs and meta-search sites also earn revenues from ad placements. Booking fees
were an additional source of revenue for the OTAs, eliminated prior to the timespan we study
in our paper: Priceline and Expedia's Hotwire stopped charging fees in 2007, and Travelocity
and Orbitz eliminated fees in 2009. Recently, some of the aggregators have reinstated these
booking fees. Finally, OTAs earn revenue from hotel and vacation packages. For Orbitz, in
2010, the revenue split was 36% from Air, 27% from Hotel, 15% from Vacation Packages,
7% from Media and Advertising and the remaining from Other (Orbitz 10K, 2010).
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Distribution fees
All OTAs use global distribution systems (GDSs), which are ight-reservation systems. Every
time a ticket is purchased through an OTA, the airline not only pays a commission to the
OTA (~$5), but also pays a fee to the GDS (~$9). The GDS then passes approximately 50%
of this fee to the OTA. To avoid paying the distribution fee, airlines have been trying to create
their own reservation systems. Another reason for airlines to own their reservation systems
is that GDSs do not have the capabilities to showcase add-on features such as upgrades.
For these two reasons, American, at the time of its contract renewal in December 2010,
wanted Orbitz to use its Direct Connect reservation system instead of relying on Sabre's
GDS. Orbitz, however, resisted making the change, because it would mean the loss of nearly
half of its revenues whenever an American ticket is booked.
2.1 Consumers' valuation of airlines and aggregators
In the absence of an aggregator, airline visits can decrease, increase, or stay the same:
they could decrease if consumers are less likely to nd the airline in the absence of the
aggregator, they could increase if the value of visiting an additional airline is informative to
the consumer, and they could stay the same if visiting additional sites adds no value or is
too costly. Similarly, aggregator visits when the aggregator is not comprehensive can either
decrease or stay the same.
Consumers typically visit both aggregators and airlines to learn about their best match
value. Consumers can gain partial information about airlines by visiting an aggregator, but
to learn additional airline-specic details, the consumer has to visit the airline. In addition,
aggregators help consumers nd their match by increasing their probability of discovering
an airline.
Consider a path where a consumer visits the aggregator and one airline before making
her purchase. We now delineate cases where in the absence of an aggregator, airline visits
stay the same, increase, or decrease.
1. Airline visits stay the same. This scenario would occur when the consumer knows
about and continues to visit the rst airline, but the information gain from another
airline does not justify the additional visit.
2. Airline visits increase. Under this scenario, visiting an additional airline is informative
to the consumer. Furthermore, she needs to be aware of the existence of this airline,
i.e., the probability of discovery is greater than zero.
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3. Airline visits decrease. Because the consumer's valuation of visiting the individual
airline was high (she visited the airline when the aggregator was present), the only way
this scenario would occur is if the probability of discovery drops to 0; that is without
the aggregator, the consumer is unable to nd her true match.
We now delineate cases where, when the aggregator is not comprehensive, aggregator visits
can either decrease or stay the same. To simplify the illustration, we assume one airline
decides to opt out of being included in the aggregator.
1. Aggregator visits stay the same. This scenario would occur if the absence of the airline
does not change the information value drastically; that is it is still worth learning
partial information about the remaining airlines.
2. Aggregator visits decrease. When the aggregator is not comprehensive, the partial
information available at the aggregator is insucient to justify the cost of a visit.
Therefore, the true impact of a rm's absence from an aggregator is an empirical one and
depends on the context (e.g., the airline industry is likely to behave very dierently from the
hotel industry).
3 Data
To understand how consumers search and buy tickets online, we need detailed browsing data
that track consumers' website visits across various domains. We use comScore's web behavior
database, which consists of a sample of 50,000 internet users randomly chosen from a cross-
section of more than 2 million internet users (comScore Database Manual). We supplement
this dataset with the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) from the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics to get measures of demand and prices. The DB1B database is a
10% sample of airline tickets consisting of origin, operating carrier, number of passengers,
and itinerary fare aggregated at the quarterly level every year. The data cover 37 airlines
and over 500 airports. We also use the Nielsen Monitor-Plus media database to get measures
of ad expenditure by brands across various types of media.
From the comScore database, we select those searches and transactions that pertain to
airlines and aggregators. We select the top airlines, by passengers own as reported in
the DB1B survey, which have non-zero transactions in the comScore database. We further
select those domains that have at least 10,000 visits (searches and transactions) across our
panel: the cuto is at 13,433 visits for Alaska Airlines, with the next popular domain being
CheapAir with only 6,608 visits. Table 1 shows the included websites, the total number of
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search-related visits to each domain, and the number of transactions. We do not include
Google Flights and Bing Travel because our data do not distinguish sub-domains, i.e., we
cannot identify google.com/ights separately from google.com. Including all of Google's
and Bing's searches would increase our datasize immensely without necessarily increasing
the accuracy of our estimates. Moreover, Google Flights was launched in late 2011 and is
therefore unlikely to interfere with the dispute period, which was in early 2011.
The number of unique users who visit airline or aggregator websites ranges from 26,000-
30,000 across the years 2010-2012. comScore tracks the exact timestamp for when a particular
website was visited. Each visit comprises a search session, and comScore tracks the duration
spent, the number of pages viewed, and whether a transaction was made in that session.
Table 2 summarizes these statistics across all users as well as conditional on those users who
made a purchase. Furthermore, user demographics such as income, education, and zipcode
are present in the dataset.
A majority of visits to airline/aggregator websites (~ 55%) occur in the month before
purchase, with 80% occurring within 4 months of the purchase date. We assume that all of
these visits and searches are related to the nal purchased itinerary. In a robustness check,
we verify our results, assuming only site visits one month prior to the last recorded event per
user are relevant. Our dataset also includes those searches that did not result in a purchase.
Of these, 35% visit a travel website once and never return over the course of the panel, 12%
search over the course of a month, and the remainder search repeatedly for more than a
month but never purchase. Note we do not know if these visits are directed searches toward
a purchase, or random visits.
Table 1: Total Number of Searches and Transactions on Travel Domains, 2010-2012
Airlines Aggregators
Domain Searches Transactions Domain Searches Transactions
aa.com 57,951 1,435 cheapights.com 17,364 -
airtran.com 22,256 889 cheapoair.com 63,473 -
alaskaair.com 12,740 693 expedia.com 194,459 1,878
continental.com 23,772 629 hotwire.com 49,894 288
delta.com 67,154 1,549 kayak.com 58,850 -
jetblue.com 37,413 764 orbitz.com 97,961 1,439
southwest.com 100,730 6,705 priceline.com 107,911 1,631
united.com 32,194 821 travelocity.com 70,586 963
usairways.com 23,666 827
8
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: comScore data, Travel Domains 2010-2012
All searches Conditional
on purchase
Median Mean Median Mean
Number of websites visited 4.00 10.68 9.00 16.57
Time spent on search (minutes) 21.00 71.62 58.00 120.30
Total pages viewed 22.00 69.16 56.00 113.20
Transactions 0 0.25 1 2.01
Number of unique users 82,886 10,232
Total purchases 20,511
3.1 Descriptive Evidence: Search patterns on aggregators and do-
mains
For every purchased ticket, we identify how many visits were made to an aggregator, the
purchased airline, and any non-purchased airline, prior to making a ticket purchase. Figure
1 highlights all possible browsing patterns for a typical airline, using Delta as an example.
We see that for a typical airline, the most common search pattern involves visits to all three
types of sites: aggregators, the purchased airline, and other airlines. 72% of all searches
involves the use of aggregators at least once. The only airline in contrast to this search pat-
tern is Southwest, which does not participate with any aggregator, where the most common
pattern is an user going to Southwest and making a purchase directly without any search.
Only 45% of searches use aggregators. Southwest's search pattern suggests that not being
part of an aggregator does not necessarily hurt the airline. Note that these patterns could
result if Southwest's customers are very dierent from other airlines' customers, and also if
Southwest allocates marketing resources specically recognizing it is not part of an aggrega-
tor. Moreover, we do not observe the counterfactual of what would happen if Southwest were
part of an aggregator. Our empirical exercise in Section 4 will address this issue directly.
Next, we turn to identifying when in the search history aggregators were visited relative to
the purchased airline. If consumers are fairly well informed about their destination airline and
are merely browsing other websites before making a purchase, we should see the purchased
airline being visited earlier. On the other hand, if a consumer searches an aggregator rst
and then subsequent airlines, we should see aggregators being visited earlier. To study this
pattern, we document for all purchased tickets on an airline's domain, the rank order of
the purchased airline and of any aggregator. Figure 2 plots these ranks. We observe that
for most airlines, the aggregator is visited rst and then the purchased airline. Exceptions
to this pattern are Southwest and Jetblue, the low-cost airlines, where consumers are more
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likely to visit the purchased airline rst.
Last, we document a rough measure of the relative market power of aggregators and
airlines using consumers' browsing history. We identify the number of users who browse only
a single aggregator, 2-3 dierent aggregators, or multiple aggregators. We nd that the split
is roughly a third in each group, i.e. 36% users browse a single aggregator, 32% browse 2-3
aggregators and 32% browse more than three aggregators. We do the same for airlines. In
stark contrast, loyalty to airline domains is much higher. Over 50% of users browse only a
single airline, 34% browse 2-3 airlines and the rest browse more than three airlines. Table
3 provides these summary statistics indicating that competition among aggregators is fairly
high. Next, we condition on users who browsed a given aggregator atleast once, and repeat
the exercise. Table 4 shows the split into each of these three categories, users very rarely
browse only one aggregator (7%-21%) with Expedia exhibiting the strongest loyalty. Most
users browse multiple aggregators. Repeating this exercise for airlines, and consistent with
the nding in Table 3, users exhibit more loyalty towards airlines with 17%-38% browsing
only 1 airline with Southwest exhibiting the strongest loyalty.
Although these patterns indicate the extent to which customers use aggregators to nd
their ultimate match, and show that being absent from an aggregator is not necessarily
harmful to an airline, they do not establish any causal eect. To do so, we turn to the
American-Orbitz dispute that resulted in American being unavailable on Orbitz's website
for over 5 months.
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Note: No Search indicates a user visited the site and purchased her ticket in that session. Only Purchased indicates the user
visited the purchased airline's site a few times but purchased her ticket after a few such visits. Note these two could be grouped
into one category because they both involve only the destination airline.
Figure 1: Southwest users go directly to southwest.com; all other airlines search an aggregator
before making a purchase
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Note: Rank averaged across users, and is determined by order of search per user. As an example, if a user visits an aggregator
rst and the airline where the ticket was purchased third, the aggregator's rank=1 and the purchased airline's rank=3.
Figure 2: Consumers start their search at an aggregator, except Southwest and Jetblue users
Table 3: Percent of user who browse few vs. multiple aggregators and airlines
Browse only % users Browse only % users
1 aggregator 36% 1 airline 52%
2-3 aggregators 32% 2-3 airlines 34%
>=4 aggregators 32% >=4 airlines 14%
Table 4: Of those who browse an aggregator atleast once, how many visit only that aggregator
vs. multiple
Browse only Orbitz Expedia Priceline Travelocity Kayak Hotwire Cheapoair Cheapights
1 aggregator 9% 21% 12% 11% 8% 7% 9% 7%
2-3 aggregators 28% 33% 28% 26% 20% 23% 22% 20%
>=4 aggregators 63% 45% 59% 63% 72% 69% 69% 73%
4 Empirical Evidence
We use the American-Orbitz dispute to identify the eect of the absence of a major airline
from a popular aggregator. We examine both search and purchase behavior during this
dispute period and compare it with the same period one year before and one year after.
Figure 3 plots the monthly site visits at Orbitz and American as a proportion of visits to
all travel websites. Orbitz appears to face a decline in site visits during the dispute period
(grey shaded area) in the year 2011, compared to the control periods in 2010 and 2012.
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American does not seem to be impacted. We next turn to the individual level, where for
each consumer's itinerary, we construct2 three dependent variables:
sites: the number of times a domain's website was visited in a month,
pages: the number of pages viewed at the domain's website that month, and
durn: the duration spent on the website that month.
We focus on only those months when an individual engaged in a travel-related search. If
there is a month in which no travel website is visited by an individual, we do not include
that individual-month in the data3. We rst present how the impacted domains - aa.com,
orbitz.com, and expedia.com - perform relative to their competitors and the control period.
We then explore which type of consumer the dispute had a greater impact on.
Note: The grey shaded area represents the dispute months, January-May. Year 2011 corresponds to the
year of the dispute, 2010 and 2012 serve as control years.
Figure 3: Site visits at Orbitz and American as a percent of site visits at all travel websites
4.1 Search intensity relative to competitors and control period
For each of the impacted domains, we evaluate the search intensity during the dispute period
relative to the same period in the past (2010) and future (2012) years. As controls, we choose
the same months when the dispute occurred: January-May but in the previous year and the
2When there is no nal purchase, we group all the non-purchase-related searches into one itinerary.
3In a robustness check, we expand the data to include those months when no travel-related search was
performed: this approach allows total searches to increase/decrease. When an individual did not search or
visit any given domain in a month, the dependent variables take on the value 0. Doing so allows for the
scenario where consumers increase their total search volume at a given domain when they can no longer nd
aa.com on an aggregator. The results are fairly similar in this specication but are quantitatively smaller in
magnitude because of the large number of additional 0's.
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future year: 2010 and 2012. We focus on the same set of months as the dispute period to
hold constant any seasonality patterns that might exist. We conduct a pooled (treating 2010
and 2012 equally) regression. Results are robust to an un-pooled regression (treating the
two years separately). To rule out any industry-wide trend (e.g., delta.com, priceline.com
might also be impacted), we further include competitors and measure the change relative
not only to the control periods, but also to the competitors. Note that doing so measures
the net competitive eect of the dispute period on the impacted domains. In other words,
if consumers shift their searches from Orbitz to Priceline during the dispute period, we are
measuring the decrease in Orbitz relative to the increase in Priceline, relative to the baseline
years. We address this potential contamination of the control group in Section 4.1.1.
For each of the impacted domains, we estimate the following regression separately:
yijt = 0Dt + 1Dt DispY
+ F0 Dt  Focalj + F1 Dt DispY  Focalj
+ tY + 
F
tY Focalj + i + "ijt
(1)
where i is the individual, j is the domain, and t is time in months. Here, yijt is the dependent
variable sites, durn and pages, Dt = 1 if t is between January and May, the months relevant
to the dispute period in either the treated or untreated years, DispY = 1 if the months
correspond to the year the dispute occurred (2011). Focalj is an indicator that equals 1
if travel domain j is the impacted domain, i.e., American, Orbitz, or Expedia. 0 and 1
capture the average estimate of all travel websites visited during the control and dispute
periods respectively (relative to the estimates in the rest of the year), F0 and 
F
1 capture
the additional change specic to the impacted domain's website in the control and dispute
periods respectively. F1 is the treatment eect of the dispute period. tY is the year xed
eect that controls for any year-specic trends in the industry, FtY is the year xed eect
for the impacted domain that controls for any year-specic trends in that domain, and i is
the individual xed eect. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
The results, reported in Table 5, show both Orbitz and Expedia experience a signicant
decline in site visits and duration spent by users. Site visits decline by 0.036 for Orbitz and
0.049 for Expedia. To put these numbers in context, the average number of site visits per
month at Orbitz is 0.38 which implies a 10% drop in site visits, an economically meaningful
drop. We discuss the further implications of this drop in Section 4.4. The results also show
an increase in site visits to aa.com. Figure 4 plots the increase/decrease in duration and site
visits across all three websites.
Interestingly, we see a decrease in page views to aa.com and no signicant change in page
views on orbitz.com and expedia.com. To further investigate this pattern in page visits, we
14
run a zero-inated poisson regression which separates out the number of zero visits from
those who visit, and conditional on those visiting, helps understand their behavior changes.
Following Lambert (1992), we specify site visits follow the distribution:
yijt 
8<:0 with probability pijtPoisson (ijt) with probability 1  pijt (2)
where ijt = exp (X). X uses the same specication as equation 1. The portion that
accounts for the excess zeros, pijt, is modeled using a logit model, such that pijt =
exp(X)
1+exp(X)
where X is the same specication used in equation 1. Table 6 presents the results of this
regression. From this table, we see that aa.com sees more visitors: the coecient for the
zero-inated part of the regression is negative and signicant indicating a drop in number
of zero-visits. However, conditional on a visit, aa.com sees fewer page views. We believe
this occurs because of the selection of consumers visiting the site during the dispute period.
More people visit aa.com during the dispute, but might not nd a good match and hence do
not browse as many pages, as consumers who come there with greater certainty of booking.
Similarly, for Orbitz and Expedia, fewer people visit the site but those who visit are a select
group who care more about other airlines information and hence browse more pages.
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coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.022 7.22 0.021 6.87 0.018 6.30
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.009 -1.87 -0.006 -1.21 -0.005 -1.08
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.006 -0.81 0.027 3.06 0.067 5.60
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.023 1.90 -0.036 -2.18 -0.049 -2.48
(2) duration
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.186 6.87 0.173 6.63 0.135 5.29
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.054 -1.22 -0.033 -0.75 -0.024 -0.57
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.034 -0.40 0.194 2.24 0.836 7.74
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.090 0.59 -0.272 -2.17 -0.417 -2.45
(3) pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.228 8.39 0.246 8.97 0.207 7.69
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.095 -1.92 -0.124 -2.43 -0.115 -2.28
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.407 3.51 0.107 1.49 0.762 8.07
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 -0.428 -1.94 0.070 0.62 -0.085 -0.57
N obs 4,389,417
N id 82,886
Fixed eects id, year, year X focal
Cluster id
Note: Tables present di-in-di analyses using all competitors as controls for each of the three
dependant variables (1) sites, (2) duration and (3) pages. Each table presents 3 separate regressions
run for each of the impacted domains, aa.com, orbitz.com and expedia.com. Jan-May is an
indicator for the ve months January-May, Dispute is an indicator for the year of the dispute
2011, Focal is an indicator for the impacted domain F1 is the relevant treatment eect.
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Table 6: Di-in-di analysis using Zero-inated poisson regression
(1) pages aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.042 3.70 0.064 5.46 0.047 3.75
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.030 -1.34 -0.066 -2.83 -0.062 -2.50
Jan-May X Domain F0 0.151 3.43 -0.094 -3.46 0.048 2.34
Jan-May X Dispute X Domain F1 -0.278 -2.82 0.197 3.86 0.110 2.72
Zero-Inate
Jan-May 0 -0.049 -9.51 -0.036 -7.02 -0.036 -6.44
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.054 5.94 0.032 3.62 0.042 4.33
Jan-May X Domain F0 0.042 2.46 -0.134 -11.14 -0.101 -9.23
Jan-May X Dispute X Domain F1 -0.171 -5.97 0.149 7.01 0.033 1.72
(2) sites aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.009 0.60 0.018 1.31 0.005 0.34
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.014 -0.58 -0.025 -1.08 -0.010 -0.42
Jan-May X Domain F0 0.018 0.42 -0.095 -2.69 0.016 0.67
Jan-May X Dispute X Domain F1 -0.084 -1.08 0.070 0.95 -0.039 -0.92
Zero-Inate
Jan-May 0 -0.047 -5.34 -0.027 -3.26 -0.035 -3.84
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.049 3.28 0.020 1.47 0.039 2.59
Jan-May X Domain F0 0.050 2.00 -0.205 -8.15 -0.113 -4.71




Note: Tables present di-in-di analyses using zero-inated poisson regression. Each table presents 3
separate regressions run for each of the impacted domains, aa.com, orbitz.com and expedia.com, run
for the dependant variable pages. The regressions for sites is also shown for comparison. Jan-May
is an indicator for the ve months January-May, Dispute is an indicator for the year of the dispute
2011, Focal is an indicator for the impacted domain. F1 is the relevant treatment eect pertaining
to a change in zero-visits. A negative F1 implies fewer zero-visits.
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Notes: * signicant at the 95% level.
Figure 4: Duration spent and sites visited decreased for orbitz.com and expedia.com
4.1.1 Alternative Control Groups
We perform three additional exercises described below that do not directly rely on competi-
tors as controls to establish the magnitude and the robustness of the eect.
Di Analysis
First, we perform a simple di analysis without using any competitors as controls. Assuming
that the dispute period (Jan-May 2011) is comparable to the same period in the previous/post
years (Jan-May 2010, 2012) in terms of seasonality, trends etc., this estimate tells us how
much site visits changed in the year of the dispute relative to the same months in other years.
This simple before-after analysis gives us one estimate of the lower bound on the impact of
the dispute.
We run a regression specied by Equation 3, where 1 is the treatment eect of the
dispute period. This regression includes only the impacted domains (competitor domains
are excluded for this simple before-after analysis). For each of the dependant variables - sites,
duration and pages - and for each of the impacted domains, we run a separate regression.
yijt = 0Dt + 1Dt DispY
+ tY + i + "ijt
(3)
where yijt is the dependant variable (sites, duration, pages visited on domain j) by
individual i in month t. Dt = 1 if t is between January and May, the months relevant to the
dispute period in either the treated or untreated years, DispY = 1 if the months correspond
to the year the dispute occurred (2011). tY and i are year and individual xed-eects
respectively.
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Di-in-Di Analysis with Unlikely Competitors as Controls
Second, we estimate the same di-in-di regression (Equation 1) as before, but use competi-
tors that are unlikely substitutes to the impacted domains. This helps rule out the fact that
users would substitute to these domains during the dispute period. For each of the impacted
domains, we measure the usage of the other domains to see which domains are least used
together. For both Orbitz and Expedia, these domains are Cheapights, Hotwire, Kayak and
Cheapoair. Moreover, to your point in (iii) below, that not all these domains have airlines
as their main focus, we restrict attention to Kayak and Cheapights that focus on airlines
(similar to Orbitz). Moreover, Kayak and Cheapights are suciently dierent from Orbitz
and Expedia in their business models: while users can book directly on Orbitz, Kayak and
Cheapights refer consumers to airline websites, earning a commission for each referral. All
these taken together make Kayak and Cheapights unlikely competitors, but at the same
time good controls for any industry-wide trends. For American, these domains are Alaska
Air and Airtran, which are rarely browsed by those users who browse American.
Di-in-Di Analysis with Lonely Planet as a Control
Third, we conduct a di-in-di analysis using visits to the website LonelyPlanet as a control.
Per the entire review team's concerns and suggestions, we wanted to select a control site that
is 1) unlikely to have spillovers from the treated rms (ruling out all websites where one can
book airfare or hotels), but 2) still faces similar travel industry trends. Moreover, Lonely
Planet is the only website where one cannot make a booking and is ranked among the top
15 travel websites4.
Table 7 presents the results of the (1) simple before-after analysis, (2) di-in-di analysis
using unlikely competitors as controls, and (3) di-in-di analysis using LonelyPlanet as
a control. The results excluding the treated rms as well as the original results are also
presented for comparison. The results show that across all three specications, there was
no signicant change in users browsing behavior on aa.com, while Orbitz and Expedia see
a signicant decline in their browsing behavior during the dispute period. Moreover, the
magnitude of the drop is identical: 0.03 site visits for Orbitz, 0.04 site visits for Expedia.
For brevity we present results for only the dependant variable sites here. Tables 22-24 in
Appendix A show the results for all three dependant variables: sites, duration and pages.
4http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/travel-websites
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Table 7: Site visits to aa.com unchanged, to orbitz.com and expedia.com drop during
the dispute period: Results robust to three dierent analyses
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
(1) before-after analysis
Jan-May 0 0.017 1.89 0.056 5.12 0.100 6.51
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.016 1.10 -0.035 -1.91 -0.037 -1.52
N obs 258,201
N id 82,886
(2) di-in-di (unlikely competitors as controls)
Jan-May 0 0.006 1.95 0.021 5.64 0.023 5.45
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.009 1.47 -0.008 -1.24 -0.005 -0.64
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.003 0.41 0.025 2.76 0.063 5.17
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.006 0.44 -0.031 -1.82 -0.044 -2.15
N obs 774,603
N id 82,886
(3) di-in-di (LonelyPlanet as control)
Jan-May 0 0.010 3.56 0.013 3.84 0.015 3.51
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.004 -0.79 -0.001 -0.15 0.005 0.60
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.002 0.27 0.032 3.51 0.069 5.56
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.016 1.36 -0.038 -2.19 -0.048 -2.36
N obs 525,300
N id 83,991
(3) di-in-di analysis (exclude treated websites from control)
Jan-May 0 0.015 5.44 0.015 5.53 0.016 5.52
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.005 -1.25 -0.005 -1.16 -0.004 -0.97
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.000 0.03 0.031 3.48 0.069 5.70
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.018 1.47 -0.038 -2.24 -0.050 -2.50
N obs 3,873,015
N id 82,886
(4) di-in-di analysis (original)
Jan-May 0 0.022 7.22 0.021 6.87 0.018 6.30
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.009 -1.87 -0.006 -1.21 -0.005 -1.08
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.006 -0.81 0.027 3.06 0.067 5.60
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.023 1.90 -0.036 -2.18 -0.049 -2.48
N obs 4,389,417
N id 82,886
Fixed eects machine id, Year, Year X Focal
Cluster machine id
Note: (1) presents a before-after analysis for visits to the treated domains. (2) presents a di-in-di anal-
ysis comparing searches of those who browsed American/Orbitz/Expedia to those who browsed unlikely
competitors: Alaska and AirTran for American, and Kayak and Cheapights for Orbitz and Expedia. (3)
presents a di-in-di analysis using visits to LonelyPlanet as a control. (4) presents a di-in-di analysis
using all competitors (airlines and aggregators) except the treated rms as controls. (5) presents a di-
in-di analysis using all competitors as controls. Each table presents 3 separate regressions run for the
dependant variables sites. 1 in (1) and 
F
1 in (2),(3), (4) and (5) are the relevant treatment eects.
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4.1.2 Robustness Checks
In the main analysis, we assume all searches prior to the nal visit/transaction are relevant.
We now verify if our results are robust to using much shorter windows of search: 1 month and
2 months, i.e., we only use visits to travel domains up to 1 month and 2 months before the
last visit. Tables 25 and 26 in Appendix B report the relevant estimates. We nd that our
results are robust to these specications; specically, we see Orbitz is negatively impacted
(even more so) during the dispute period.
Next, we test if our results are robust to removing outliers in the data. The data contains
instances when the number of pages viewed in a single session exceeds 100 and the duration
spent exceeds 1 hour. In such instances a browsing window could have remained open for
too long without active search. We therefore remove those sessions that exceed the 99th
percentile in the data: more than 51 page views and 61 minutes for a single session. The
results reported in Table 27 of Appendix B are fairly identical to our main results in Table
5.
Finally, Expedia brought back American fares after 3 months. To verify if the results
are robust to this smaller time window, Table 28 in Appendix B shows this change for this
3-month period. As can be seen, the eects are similar.
4.1.3 Total Searches
In this section, we test to see if the dispute had an impact on the total number of searches
conducted by a consumer: do consumers augment their searches causing an increase in
total sites visited, do they drop a few websites causing a decrease, or does the total search
intensity remain unchanged. To conduct this analysis, we include all months (per individual)
irrespective of whether a search was conducted. We then evaluate 1) changes in the total
intensity of search, and 2) whether the treated rms exhibit the same patterns documented
thus far.
We nd, across all outcome measures, individuals search less during the dispute period.
To understand if this is driven by individuals searching less at airlines, or aggregators, or
both, we split the outcome measures by searches at each group. Table 8 reports the results
for Total Searches, Searches at Aggregators, and Searches at Airlines. We nd that most
of the decline in searches comes from a drop in aggregator usage. Airline usage is largely
unchanged with the exception of pages visited which sees a drop. Taken together these results
indicate that without comprehensive aggregators, aggregators stand to lose, and perhaps to
some extent airlines as well because consumers might now nd poorer matches. However,
to conclusively state if these changes are economically meaningful we rely on the demand
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analysis conducted in Section 4.3.
We further nd, similar to our main analysis, that search patterns on this expanded
dataset indicate a decline in site visits at Orbitz and Expedia (Table 9). Moreover, as a
percentage change, these numbers are fairly identical to our main analysis: 10.8% for Orbitz
and 9% for Expedia.
Table 8: Total Searches
(1) All sites duration pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.126 13.09 0.987 11.56 1.182 14.20
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.063 -3.99 -0.477 -3.48 -0.716 -4.95
(2) Aggregators sites duration pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.096 13.88 0.763 12.03 0.777 13.77
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.063 -5.52 -0.467 -4.77 -0.365 -4.38
(3) Airlines sites duration pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.030 6.24 0.224 5.07 0.405 7.85
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.001 0.08 -0.010 -0.13 -0.351 -3.30
N obs 1,267,152
N id 82,886
Fixed eects id, year
Cluster id
Note: Table presents a di analysis across (1) all domains, (2) all aggregators, and
(3) all airlines on the dependant measures total sites, total duration spent and total
pages. The data is expanded to include months of no search. 1 is the relevant
treatment eect.
Table 9: Di-in-di analysis including no-search months
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.008 13.06 0.007 12.76 0.006 11.58
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.004 -4.24 -0.003 -3.67 -0.003 -3.48
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.002 -0.97 0.009 4.90 0.026 9.89
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.005 1.93 -0.009 -2.50 -0.014 -3.30
N obs 21,541,584
N id 82,886




The literature on manufacturer-retailer interactions has two main theoretical predictions that
relate to competition and loyalty. On competition, the literature (e.g., O'Brien and Shaer
1997, Kadiyali et al 2000) suggests increased manufacturer competition makes for higher
retailer market power. On loyalty, the literature suggests loyalty can relieve competition
thus giving the manufacturer more power (see Ailawadi et al (2010) for a review of the
theoretical work around this). Our setting allows us to empirically test these two theoretical
predictions.
We operationalize manufacturer competition using the localized nature of airline compe-
tition that provides variation across airports5. We expect that in airports that face more
competition (and have a strong American presence) the aggregators Expedia and Orbitz will
not be signicantly impacted during the dispute, i.e. the retailer has more power.
We operationalize loyalty to aggregators/airlines based on consumers' usage of aggrega-
tors/airlines. We expect the biggest change to occur among consumers who use multiple
aggregators, i.e., users who are least loyal to Expedia/Orbitz.
In addition, we also expect that airports with no American presence will see little impact
of the dispute. Similarly, airports where American is the most important airline will also see
little impact of the dispute. Such users might be fairly well informed of American's oerings
and primarily use aggregators to learn about competing airlines' oerings, which Orbitz
and Expedia still oer. We test all three dimensions of heterogeneity (American presence,
competition, loyalty) below.
4.2.1 Airports with No American Presence, High American Presence vs. the
rest
We use the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database to infer the importance
of each airline to an airport. We create an importance score, impmj, for each airline j -airport




where dmj is the total number of passengers who ew from origin airport m in airline j across
the years 2010-2012 and
P
j dmj sums across all passengers for that airport across all top
airlines.
The comScore data provides us with the zipcode of each individual user in the panel.
5We thank the Editor for this insight
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From this, we infer the closest airport to each user, using the Euclidean distance between
every airport and the center of the user's zipcode as our distance measure. We then merge the
importance measure to the comScore data to determine if a consumer lives near an airport
where American is absent or prominent.
We subset airports based on relative presence of American airlines: (1) those where
American has no presence, i.e., impm;AA = 0 . We consider the nearest as well as the second
nearest airport to a consumer's zipcode if that second airport is within 50 miles, to allow for
substitution between nearby airports. We also add the constraint that the airport have atleast
one major airline operating, to avoid considering small regional airports where consumers
might travel farther (for example, AHN is a regional airport with no major airlines, but
a consumer can easily drive to ATL which is a 1.5hr/78 mile drive away) (2) those where
American has a high presence, i.e., it is one of the top two airlines as measured by passengers
served at that airport, and (3) those where American is neither absent nor most important6.
We expect the impact of the dispute to be strongest for the last subset (3), where American
is neither absent nor most important, because this is where the role of aggregators is most
relevant.
Table 10 presents the results for each subset, as well as the results for the entire dataset.
As expected, we do not see any eect on the treated rms at airports where American has
no presence. Similarly, consumers living near airports with high American presence do not
change their behavior. This is because they likely know about American and use aggregators
to search for other airlines (such as United) for whom the aggregators are still useful. The last
subset (3) is where we nd the strongest eect of the dispute, supporting our hypothesis.
Consumers who live close to an airport where another airline is prominent (e.g., United)
drop their usage of Orbitz and Expedia. Such consumers might not be well informed of
American's fares, and therefore might use aggregators to conduct a comprehensive search of
their options. However, now that Orbitz and Expedia are not as informative, they are less
useful. In fact, comparing the estimates of this subset to that using all the data, the results
are stronger both in signicance as well as magnitude.
We also repeat this exercise using a simple di analysis, without using competitors to
see if the direction of the results hold. Table 29 in Appendix B presents the results of this
simple di specication, conrming the direction of the eect.
6Airports with no American presence are typically small with an average yearly passenger count of 81 per
airport. Airports include Adak Regional , Mid Delta Regional and Frank Wiley Field. Those that have high
American presence include all of American's hubs (LAX, ORD, DFW, LGA, JFK and MIA) as well as many
smaller regional airports like Waco Regional and Tyler Pounds Regional where American is the prominent
player. Airports that are neither include big airports like Atlanta where Delta is the most important player
and San Diego where Southwest is the most important player along with many smaller airports.
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4.2.2 Competitive airports
Per the theoretical literature, we expect that in airports that face more competition (and have
a strong American presence) the aggregators Expedia and Orbitz will not be signicantly
impacted during the dispute, i.e. the retailer has more power. We dene each airport's




where dmj is the passenger
demand for airport m and airline j. We dene a high competition airport for American as
one where 1) hhi < 0:18 which is the 75th percentile across all airports (the mean hhi is
0.14). and 2) American has a signicant presence, i.e., it forms atleast 10% of the passenger
demand at that airport. We add this restriction because we are not interested in high
competition airports where the competition is between two un-treated airlines. We also
consider American's hubs: American has 6 hubs all of which are fairly competitive. Finally,
we identify cities that have multiple hubs at dierent airports atleast one of which is an
American hub. As an example, Chicago has ORD (United, American), MDW (Southwest)
and MKE (Southwest and Airtran). Therefore, we include consumers who live near all three
airports and not just those who live near ORD
We combine all three measures of competition: airports that are hubs for multiple airlines,
cities that have multiple hubs at dierent airports, and airports that have high competition.
Airports that satisfy all three criteria are LAX, LGA and ORD. On the other extreme,
we classify as low competition, airports that are not hubs for multiple airlines and are not
in cities that have multiple hubs, and have low competition as dened by hhi  0:18. In
addition, we exclude airports with no American presence or high American presence to
ensure we analyze areas where the aggregator is needed (per the analysis in Section 4.2.1 the
aggregator's function is minimal in these two extremes of American's presence). 81 airports
satisfy this criteria and are included in the\low competition"analysis. Tables 11 and 30 show
the di-in-di analysis as well as simple di analysis. These tables show that the retailers
(Orbitz and Expedia) are not impacted in areas where there is high competition. Finally, we
note that our data does not have enough power to do a D-D-D analysis between areas with
low competition and the rest.
4.2.3 Loyalty: Multiple vs single use of aggregators/airlines
Section 3.1 documents the dierence in consumers' usage behavior of aggregators and airlines,
with some consumers visiting only 1 aggregator and others visiting multiple aggregators.
Given this dierence in usage behavior, we conduct the analysis separately on these dierent
groups. We expect those who use multiple aggregators will see the biggest change in behavior.
Table 12 validates our hypothesis. Column (3) suggests those who use Expedia combined
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with other aggregators during search, are the ones who stop using Expedia during the dispute.
Column (1) suggests those who use only Expedia to inform their search do not change their
behavior during the dispute period. A similar pattern holds for Orbitz as well, seen in Table
13. This analysis shows that competition in the aggregator space matters: the decline is
strongest among users who view aggregators as close substitutes.
We repeat the same exercise, but now as dened by consumers' usage of American,
reported in Table 14. Column (1) of Table 14 suggests those loyal to American increase
their browsing on American during the dispute period. This pattern does not replicate for
those users not loyal towards American. Examining the group of loyal users further, we split
them into those who use aggregators vs. those who do not. We nd the increase in visits
to American is driven by those who use aggregators (Table 15). We conrm this is driven
by users who visit Orbitz and Expedia, and not just any aggregator. We therefore believe
this pattern occurs because information is unavailable on two of the aggregators, such users
come to American more often. As a placebo check, we repeat the same exercise as dened
by consumers' usage of Delta and do not nd such a pattern (Table 16).
Note that while the above grouping is indicative of users' loyalty, it is also contaminated
by the treatment (for example, American might have users that are more loyal during the
dispute because of the dispute). Therefore, for all of these analyses, we expand the dataset
to include months of no-search as well to allow for changes in the extensive margin thus
mitigating such a concern.
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Table 10: Site visits for consumers living near airports with varying degrees of American
presence: di-in-di
(1) No American Airlines serving nearby airports
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.082 1.35 0.079 1.36 0.070 1.32
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.038 -0.53 -0.038 -0.53 -0.023 -0.34
Jan-May X Domain F0 -0.042 -1.06 0.006 0.06 0.160 0.74
Jan-May X Dispute X Domain F1 0.046 0.7 0.037 0.33 -0.220 -0.96
N obs 20,451
N 469
(2) American is most important airline in nearest airport
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.006 0.77 0.006 0.9 0.004 0.62
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.022 1.89 0.019 1.69 0.022 1.97
Jan-May X Domain F0 0.011 0.59 -0.001 -0.04 0.033 1.39
Jan-May X Dispute X Domain F1 -0.017 -0.56 0.034 0.77 -0.021 -0.58
N obs 1,035,283
N 20,248
(3) Airport is neither American-absent or American-important
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.027 8.21 0.024 7.56 0.021 7.16
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.018 -3.3 -0.012 -2.27 -0.012 -2.38
Jan-May X Domain F0 -0.010 -1.27 0.041 4.7 0.086 6.16





coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.022 7.23 0.020 6.77 0.017 6.14
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.008 -1.72 -0.005 -0.99 -0.004 -0.84
Jan-May X Domain F0 -0.006 -0.77 0.031 3.59 0.074 6.1
Jan-May X Dispute X Domain F1 0.023 1.85 -0.041 -2.42 -0.054 -2.7
N obs 4,298,671
N 81,418
Note: This table presents a di-in-di analysis for visits to the treated domains for three subsets of
the data, 1) airports with No American presence, 2) Airports where American is the most important
airline and 3) the rest. The hypothesis is that we will see the strongest eect of the dispute in susbet
(3), because this is where the role of aggregators is most relevant. For reference, analysis using All data
is also presented. A few individuals do not have an associated zipcode and therefore drop out of this
analysis. F1 is the relevant treatment eect.
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Table 11: Site visits for consumers living near airports with varying degrees of competition:
di-in-di
(1) High competition airports
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.025 1.47 0.028 1.8 0.028 1.7
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.001 -0.04 0.002 0.07 0.001 0.02
Jan-May X Domain F0 0.079 1.66 0.030 0.44 0.024 0.39
Jan-May X Dispute X Domain F1 -0.033 -0.5 -0.084 -0.99 -0.061 -0.68
N obs 216,270
N 4,110
(2) Low competition airports
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.022 4.33 0.019 3.89 0.017 3.58
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.018 -2.17 -0.011 -1.39 -0.011 -1.36
Jan-May X Domain F0 0.007 0.62 0.054 3.99 0.092 4.95
Jan-May X Dispute X Domain F1 0.030 1.34 -0.083 -2.24 -0.093 -2.08
N obs 939,420
N 19,312
Table 12: Di-in-di analysis by varying degrees of Expedia's market power
(1) (2) (3)
Only Expedia Expedia and Expedia and more
1-2 others than 2 others
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.001 2.50 0.003 4.89 0.013 9.32
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.001 1.43 0.001 0.42 -0.006 -2.65
Jan-May X Expedia F0 0.033 3.02 0.025 3.60 0.054 9.51
Jan-May X Dispute X Exp. F1 -0.002 -0.14 -0.014 -0.97 -0.032 -3.34
N obs 2,352,732 4,017,168 6,985,368
N 10,746 16,522 22,301
Note: Table presents 3 separate regressions for each of the three groups of users: (1) those who browse
only Expedia and no other aggregator, (2) those who browse Expedia and 1-2 other aggregators, and
(3) those who browse Expedia and more than 2 other aggregators. The last group are the least loyal
to Expedia, and we expect these users to drop their site visits to Expedia.
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Table 13: Di-in-di analysis by varying degrees of Orbitz's market power
(1) (2) (3)
Only Orbitz Orbitz and Orbitz and more
1-2 others than 2 others
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.001 1.18 0.003 2.58 0.016 9.83
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.001 -0.51 -0.003 -1.19 -0.009 -3.05
Jan-May X Orbitz F0 0.017 2.27 0.009 1.03 0.033 5.98
Jan-May X Dispute X Orbitz F1 0.005 0.36 0.007 0.28 -0.032 -3.80
N obs 604,452 2,078,148 5,938,848
N 2,669 8,403 18,563
Note: Table presents 3 separate regressions for each of the three groups of users: (1) those who
browse only Orbitz and no other aggregator, (2) those who browse Orbitz and 1-2 other aggregators,
and (3) those who browse Orbitz and more than 2 other aggregators. The last group are the least
loyal to Orbitz, and we expect these users to drop their site visits to Orbitz.
Table 14: Di-in-di analysis by varying degrees of AA's market power
Only AA AA and AA and more
1-2 others than 2 others
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.006 3.29 0.012 5.95 0.016 4.27
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.004 -1.45 -0.002 -0.54 -0.007 -1.07
Jan-May X AA F0 -0.002 -0.11 0.024 2.18 0.009 0.97
Jan-May X Dispute X AA F1 0.068 2.86 -0.015 -0.83 0.005 0.32
N obs 804,168 1,870,068 2,270,520
N 3,603 6,478 5,121
Note: Table presents 3 separate regressions for each of the three groups of users: (1) those
who browse only AA and no other airlines, (2) those who browse AA and 1-2 other airlines,
and (3) those who browse AA and more than 2 other airlines.
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Table 15: Di-in-di analysis for those who browse only AA: by varying
degrees of aggregator usage
Only AA
No aggregator Use aggregators
coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 N/A N/A 0.009 3.30
Jan-May X Dispute 1 N/A N/A -0.005 -1.40
Jan-May X AA F0 0.038 1.74 -0.018 -0.85
Jan-May X Dispute X AA F1 -0.001 -0.03 0.098 3.12
N obs 243,780 560,388
N 1,168 2,435
Note: Table presents 2 separate regressions for the subset of users who browse only Ameri-
can and no other airline. This group is further susbet into those who never use aggregators
and those who use atleast one aggregator.
Table 16: Placebo check: Di-in-di analysis by varying degrees of Delta's
market power
Only Delta Delta and Delta and more
1-2 others than 2 others
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.004 2.53 0.014 7.22 0.019 5.54
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.000 0.16 -0.008 -2.83 -0.009 -1.59
Jan-May X AA F0 -0.014 -0.76 0.010 1.15 -0.011 -0.99
Jan-May X Dispute X AA F1 0.021 0.61 -0.023 -1.38 0.030 2.01
N obs 959,820 2,121,192 2,431,272
N 4,282 7,287 5,418
Note: Table presents 3 separate regressions for each of the three groups of users: (1) those who
browse only Delta and no other airlines, (2) those who browse Delta and 1-2 other airlines,
and (3) those who browse Delta and more than 2 other airlines.
4.3 Demand: Purchases on aggregators and airlines
We now explore whether the dispute period had an impact on purchases. We rst use the
comScore data, which track transactions at the domain level, to measure changes in Orbitz's
and American's purchases. Note that because comScore tracks only online transactions, we
might miss any airline sales that occurred through other channels such as oine travel agents
or over the phone. To account for all sales, we therefore use the DB1B database to measure
the total impact of the dispute on American's sales.
The comScore data also does not have an accurate measure of prices. Prices are un-
observed if there was no transaction. Although prices can be constructed from publicly
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available data, we do not know the (potential) destination of the consumer. Therefore, our
analysis in section 4.3.2 which uses the DB1B database and which has prices at the quarterly
level for every origin-destination pair and carrier will help us further account for prices in
the demand estimation.
4.3.1 Airline and aggregator demand: comScore data
We rst expand the data to include the outside option. We do so to allow for the fact that
users might use other channels (e.g. oine travel agents) to make their airline bookings or
choose not to participate in the airline market. We include both 1) all months of search as
potential months when a consumer could have purchased a ticket and 2) only the last month
of search as a potential month of purchase. The latter option is closer to reality because
those who buy always purchase on the last month of browsing, so one can assume safely that
for all no purchases, they would have purchased in the last month of search.
For each individual-month-option, we specify the utility to be:
uijt = 0jDt + 1jDt DisputeY + Adjt + jtY + "ijt (4)
where Dt is an indicator for the dispute months (Jan-May) in any year, DisputeY is
the treatment year 2011. Adjt is the total advertising spend in that month. 1j is the
treatment eect. jtY are year xed eects. We consider four possible options: 1) the
outside option or the no purchase option, 2) purchase on the treated aggregators Orbitz
and Expedia, 3) purchase on any of the other aggregators, and 4) purchase on any airline
(excluding American7). We construct the advertising variable, Adjt, as the sum of Ad spend
of all rms within each option.
Assuming the unobserved (to the researcher) shocks follow a Type-1 extreme-value dis-
















where Iijt is 1 if individual i booked option j in month t, and C is the choice set available to
the individual, which includes all airlines and all aggregators.
7to avoid any bias that inclusion of the treated rm might cause. We thank a reviewer for this suggestion.
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Table 17 and Figure 5 show the results of the demand estimation. The results indicate
during the dispute Orbitz and Expedia see a signicant decline in purchases. While there
is a decline in other aggregators and other airlines, this decline is neither statistically nor
economically signicant. Most of the decline goes to the outside option8 (which could be con-
sumers using oine travel agents, using other means of transportation, purchasing through
an aggregator/airline not included in the analysis, or not participating in the market at
all). Using the DB1B data (below) we nd sales of American remains unchanged during the
dispute, indicating that it is likely consumers used other means of booking their tickets: a
Washington Post (2011) article points to a shift to oine travel agents in 2011.
8We verify the increase in the \no purchase" option with a simple descriptive regression indicating the
result is not from a functional form specication.
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Table 17: Demand Estimates using comScore Data
All months Last month
(1) (2)
Base: No Purchase
Orbitz + Expedia coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0j 0.316 7.53 1.050 23.51
Jan-May X Dispute 1j -0.334 -4.30 -0.372 -4.69
Year = 2011 j;2011 0.011 0.20 0.048 0.85
Year = 2010 j;2010 0.101 2.38 0.135 3.11
Constant j -6.070 -153.41 -3.601 -86.65
Other Aggregators
Jan-May 0j 0.137 2.89 0.874 16.90
Jan-May X Dispute 1j -0.034 -0.42 -0.102 -1.24
Year = 2011 j;2011 0.221 3.49 0.243 3.77
Year = 2010 j;2010 0.352 6.67 0.361 6.86
Constant j -6.343 -98.20 -3.852 -55.45
Other Airlines
Jan-May 0j 0.102 4.60 0.836 30.68
Jan-May X Dispute 1j -0.014 -0.36 -0.068 -1.62
Year = 2011 j;2011 -0.302 -10.75 -0.266 -8.97
Year = 2010 j;2010 -0.315 -14.24 -0.287 -12.08
Constant j -4.420 -193.73 -1.953 -73.57
Ad  2.47E-05 0.37 4.00E-04 0.44
N obs 1,265,717 100,615
Note: (1) presents results of a multinomial logit where the outside option of
no purchase is constructed using all months all months of search as potential
months when a consumer could have purchased a ticket, (2) presents the results
assuming the last month of a search is when a purchase would have occurred.
Each observation is a purchase at Orbitz or Expedia, at any other aggregators,
at any airlines (excluding American), or a no purchase.
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(1) (2)
(1): No purchase constructed using all months of search as potential months when a consumer could have
purchased a ticket
(2): No purchase constructed using last month of search.
Figure 5: Change in market-share during dispute: Orbitz+Expedia see decline in purchases
To the extent that the tickets booked on Orbitz and Expedia might have been American
tickets, this is also potential evidence that American Airlines might also have been impacted
negatively. Therefore, to verify whether total demand for American Airlines changes, we use
the DB1B database, which tracks passengers (demand) by origin-carrier-quarter.
4.3.2 Airline demand: DB1B data
The DB1B data track the number of passengers who y per quarter through each carrier for
every origin-destination pair combination. We use this data to measure changes in Ameri-
can's total demand during the dispute period. This exercise is similar in spirit to Bilotkach
et al (2017), who nd that demand for American did not change during the dispute period.
Similar to their approach, we drop (1) observations with fares that are less than $0.02 per
mile that are agged as questionable, (2) markets, i.e., Origin-Destination pairs, with less
than 100 passengers in a quarter, (3) itineraries that are not round-trips, and (4) itineraries
that have more than 1-stop, i.e., we keep only non-stop and 1-stop itineraries. Itineraries that
have the same origin-destination but go through varying stops/layovers are treated equally
for purposes of the estimation. For example, we do not distinguish between LAS:CLT:ABE
and LAS:PHL:ABE, itineraries with 1 layover originating at Las Vegas (LAS) and ending at
Lehigh Valley (ABE). The dierence between our approach and Bilotkach et al.'s (2017) is
that we include data from and control for the non-dispute quarters as well: this approach
allows us to account for any yearly changes in demand that might not have anything to do
with the dispute period. We also include the future year (2012) as an additional control
and include the top nine airlines (to be consistent with the comScore demand estimation).
Finally, we also consider the outside option. We use each zipcode's population to create the
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market share of the outside option.
We model demand for airline j in a given market (O-D pair) m in quarter t, relative to
the outside option as:
ln (sjmt)  ln (s0mt) = 0Dispt + 0Dispt  TY
+ F0 Dispt  Focalj + F1 Dispt  TY  Focalj
+ Xjt + tY + j + j;tY + m + "ijt
(5)
Here, smjkt is the share of passengers that ew airline j in origin-destination (O-D) pair m
with number of stops k in quarter t, relative to all passengers ying that given O-D pair with
the same number of stops and in the quarter. Dispt is an indicator for the dispute months
(Jan-May) in any year, TY is the treatment year 2011, Focalj is the treated rm American.
Xjt is the vector of other independent variables such as price, Ads, distance, number of stops.
F1 is the treatment eect. tY , j and j;tY are year, carrier and year-carrier xed eects
respectively. m is the O-D xed eect. We instrument for price using jet fuel costs (at the
carrier-year-quarter level), number of stops in the itinerary, and the distance between Origin
and Destination.
The results of this estimation are reported in Table 18. We nd that F1 is not statistically
signicant from zero, suggesting demand for American Airlines did not change during the
dispute period.
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Table 18: Demand Estimates using DB1B data
coe t-stat
Dispute 0 -0.281 -3.09
Dispute X Treatment 1 0.000 0.00
Dispute X AA F0 0.050 0.50
Dispute X Treatment X AA F1 -0.092 -1.58
price P -0.033 -3.55













The average site visits on Orbitz, across all users who visit travel-related websites, is 0.38.
Compared to this value, a drop in monthly site visits of 0.036 (Table 5) amounts to an 10%
decline. To put this decline in perspective, as of year-end 2010, Orbitz's yearly revenue
from advertising and media revenue was $49.4m, accounting for 6.5% of its total revenue
(Orbitz 10K, 2010). For Orbitz, advertising and media revenue largely consists of revenue
from display ads, which is directly proportional to the number of site visits. With an 10%
decline in site visits, the drop in Orbitz's revenue is $4.68m. Similarly, Expedia would face
a revenue loss of $7.28m.
Orbitz's standalone air revenue was $274.6 year-end 2010, and $265m year-end 2011,
implying a 3% decline in air revenue from 2010 to 2011. This amount is close to our estimated
2.16% decline in market-share reported in section 4.3.1, Figure 5. These numbers show that
Orbitz lost a signicant source of its revenue stream during the dispute period.
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4.5 Discussion
The event study design assumes the only change that occurred during the treatment pe-
riod is the American-Orbitz dispute. To the extent other events might have occurred in the
travel industry we are measuring the net eect of these events. Two events that might be of
concern are the United-Continental merger that was announced in May 2010 and transpired
in November 2011, and the American's bankruptcy ling in November 2011. However, the
following ndings give us greater condence that we are indeed measuring the impact of the
dispute. First, while we might expect American Airlines to be impacted by these events,
Orbitz and Expedia should not be disproportionately (compared to other aggregators) im-
pacted by these events. The fact that these two aggregators are the ones that see a drop
in visits give us greater condence that we are indeed measuring the impact of the dispute.
This drop in visits for these two aggregators hold under a host of robustness checks. Second,
in our loyalty analysis we nd that the group of users who are most loyal to American airlines
and use aggregators to augment their search, are the ones who increase their site visitation
on American. Users who are not loyal to American (i.e., visit multiple other airlines) do
not exhibit this increase, nor do users who are completely loyal to American but do not
augment their search with aggregators. Moreover, Delta users do not exhibit such a pattern.
If American is beneted because of the United Continental merger, then we should not see
a disproportionate increase in American's visits by American loyalists who use aggregators,
and no increase by American loyalists who do not visit any other site. It is also unclear why
American, and not Delta, should be likely to benet from this merger. The dispute explains
these patterns better.
Finally, it is possible that in response to the dispute, the impacted domains as well as
their competitors, could have altered their marketing variables. We therefore verify airlines'
prices and all travel websites' advertising responses in the following section. If rms made




We rst check for airlines' price responses, where prices are observed using the DB1B
database. This exercise is similar in spirit to Bilotkach et al (2017), who nd that Ameri-
can's fares dropped during the dispute period. We subset the DB1B using the same criteria
described in Section 4.3.2. We calculate the average fare at the airline-year-quarter-origin-
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destination-number of stops level. The dierence between our approach and Bilotkach et al.'s
(2014) is that we include data from and control for the non-dispute quarters as well: this
approach allows us to control for any yearly changes in prices that might not have anything
to do with the dispute period; for example, if American dropped its prices in 2011, merely
including 2011 Q1 data might mislead us to infer the drop was due to the dispute. We also
include the future year (2012) as an additional control and include the top nine airlines (to
be consistent with the demand estimation). Finally, we also control for jet fuel costs which
vary by airline and month, available from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics9.
The basic price regression we estimate is:
ln (pmjkt) = 0Dt + 1Dt DispY
+ F0 Dt  Focalj + F1 Dt DispY  Focalj
+ tY + 
F
tY Focalj + j + m
+ 3costjt + "mjkt
(6)
where m is an Origin-Destination pair, j is the airline, k is the number of stops, and t is the
quarter. Here, pmjkt is the passenger-weighted average airfare charged by airline j in market
m with number of stops k in quarter t . We add additional controls, such as the number of
stops and distance between the origin and destination.
Table 19 reports results of this regression using various controls. F1 gives us the change
in American's prices relative to competitors and the baseline years. Specication (1) reports
the estimates from the basic regression in equation 6, which controls for origin-destination,
year, and carrier xed eects. Specication (2) adds controls for carrier-year xed eects
as well, (3) adds the distance between the origin-destination pair as an additional control,
(4) adds market share, and (5) adds a control for the number of stops. As can be seen,
American fares in 2011 seem to decrease relative to 2010 and 2012. However, this decrease is
not statistically signicant. This pattern is true across all specications (1)-(5). Moreover,
this result is robust to using the unweighted average fare as well.
While these results are directionally consistent with Bilotkach et al.'s (2017) ndings,
unlike their nding we nd little evidence of a statistically signicant drop. One possible
reason for this dierence is our inclusion of jet fuel costs as an explanatory variable. Figure
6 plots the dierence in jet fuel prices between American and all major carriers. We see
that American faced lower fuel costs during the dispute period. Therefore, not including this
cost control attributes all the change in prices to the dispute. American's 10k report, which
states that due to the company's fuel hedging program they saw a decrease in fuel expenses
9https://www.transtats.bts.gov/fuel.asp
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in 2011 (American 10K, 2011), is consistent with gure 6.
Table 19: Prices during the dispute and control periods: Estimates using DB1B data
1 2 3 4 5
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
0 -0.0228 -18.66 -0.0222 -18.15 -0.0222 -18.23 -0.0216 -17.82 -0.0222 -18.24
1 -0.0024 -1.13 0.0017 0.75 0.0013 0.60 0.0012 0.55 0.0015 0.67
F0 -0.0033 -1.20 -0.0031 -1.16 -0.0025 -0.94 -0.0039 -1.45 -0.0036 -1.33
F1 -0.0032 -0.69 -0.0019 -0.43 -0.0022 -0.48 -0.0022 -0.49 -0.0034 -0.75
log(cost) 0.0440 4.53 0.0888 7.96 0.0898 8.13 0.0933 8.47 0.0936 8.52
distance 0.0002 48.39 0.0002 53.35 0.0001 33.82
mkt. share 0.0185 36.13 0.0143 28.91
num. stops 0.0761 38.15
N obs 562,252
N O-D pairs 12,531
Fixed-eects O-D O-D O-D O-D O-D
Year Year Year Year Year
Carrier Carrier Carrier Carrier Carrier
Carrier-Year Carrier-Year Carrier-Year Carrier-Year
Addn. Controls distance distance distance
mkt. share mkt. share
num. stops
Note: Table presents di-in-di regression results for log(weighted market fare) with a number of dierent controls.
DB1B quarterly data at the market (O-D), carrier level used.
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Note: The grey shaded area represents the dispute months, January-May 2011.
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
Figure 6: Dierence between American's and All Major Carriers' Cost per gallon of airline
fuel (dollars)
5.2 Advertising
We use the Nielsen Monitor-Plus Media data, which consists of National TV, Spot TV,
Internet, Magazines, Newspapers, Outdoors and Radio ad spend along with the airing date
and the advertised brand. We focus on ad spend as the relevant metric and verify if any
of the impacted domains changed their ad spend in the dispute period using the regression
specication
ln (Adjt) = 0Dt + 1Dt DispY
+ F0 Dt  Focalj + F1 Dt DispY  Focalj
+ tY + 
F
tY Focalj + "ijt
(7)
where Adjt is the advertising spend of brand j in month t. Dt = 1 if t is between January
and May, the months relevant to the dispute period, DispY = 1 if the months correspond to
the year the dispute occurred (2011). Focalj is an indicator that equals 1 if travel domain j
is the impacted domain, i.e., American, Orbitz, or Expedia. We test is F1 = 0 which would
imply ad spend in the control and dispute periods are similar. Table 20 reports the relevant
estimate, F1 , for each of the advertising media types for which we have data.
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Table 20: Change in log of Ad Spend, relative to competitors and control period
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com N obs
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Internet -1.690 -1.93 -1.496 -2.41 -2.651 -4.43 991
Magazines -3.654 -2.78 -0.352 -0.34 -4.686 -4.34 769
Network TV -3.915 -5.56 -0.885 -1.04 -0.723 -0.80 514
Spot TV -1.773 -2.16 0.290 0.39 -0.851 -1.09 815
Newspapers 0.002 0.00 N/A N/A 0.990 1.51 707
Outdoors -1.543 -1.40 N/A N/A N/A N/A 480
Radio -1.143 -2.05 N/A N/A -1.479 -3.57 688
Cluster Brand
Observation Brand x Sub-brand x year x month
Overall, there appears to be a decline in ad spend by American. Both Orbitz and Expedia
appear to have decreased their ad spend pertaining to display ads. There are insucient
observations in Newspaper, Outdoor and Radio to make meaningful conclusions. To better
understand the decrease in display ad spend by the impacted domains, we look at each
domain separately. Interestingly, we nd that this relative decrease in ad spend is driven
by other aggregators (Cheapights, Priceline) and airlines (Alaska, JetBlue) increasing their
ad spend during the dispute period. This could be a competitive response by players such
as Priceline and Cheapights to make the most of Orbitz's shortcomings during the dispute
period. Both Orbitz and Travelocity increased their magazine spending, partly inuencing
the relative decline in American's and Expedia's magazine ad spend. All these changes in
advertising spending, which could be strategic responses by rms and their competitors,
further highlights the need to control for this marketing variable in our demand analysis
(Equations 4 and 5). We now verify that our main search results are robust to controlling
for ad spend. Table 21 reports the results of this estimation. We nd that our results are
robust to adding advertising controls.
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Table 21: Searches on impacted domains, controlling for ad spend across all media
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
(1) sites
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.022 7.15 0.020 6.53 0.018 6.11
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.019 -3.84 -0.015 -3.05 -0.014 -2.92
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.019 -2.48 0.027 3.13 0.061 5.10
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.032 2.62 -0.045 -2.75 -0.050 -2.52
Ad spend  1.38E-08 58.70 1.40E-08 59.79 1.29E-08 54.45
(2) duration
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.184 6.81 0.165 6.32 0.130 5.12
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.133 -2.99 -0.104 -2.37 -0.095 -2.21
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.134 -1.57 0.199 2.30 0.787 7.29
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.160 1.05 -0.347 -2.77 -0.423 -2.48
Ad spend  1.11E-07 48.33 1.12E-07 48.82 1.05E-07 45.61
(3) pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.226 8.32 0.238 8.70 0.203 7.53
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.170 -3.40 -0.191 -3.72 -0.182 -3.58
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.313 2.69 0.112 1.55 0.716 7.58
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 -0.361 -1.63 -0.001 -0.01 -0.091 -0.61
Ad spend  1.05E-07 46.50 1.05E-07 47.01 9.94E-08 44.12
N obs 4,389,417
N id 82,886
Fixed eects id, year, year X focal
Cluster id
6 Conclusion
In the context of the airline industry, we nd that airlines have more market power than the
aggregator. The aggregator stands to lose, in terms of consumers visiting its website and
purchases, when it is not comprehensive. The consumer heterogeneity patterns in the data
further support this conclusion. Consumers who live near airports where a non-American
42
airline is prominent (e.g., United) drop their usage of Orbitz the most. It is for these
consumers that American's ight and fare information is perhaps the most useful: they likely
already know United's ights and fares and would want to know if there are other better
oerings. Not nding information about a relevant competitor makes Orbitz a less useful
site. For an aggregator where a sizable portion of the revenue comes from ad placements,
this implies an economically signicant drop in revenue.
Our nding accentuates the necessity of understanding market power on a case by case
basis and is relevant to policy makers and regulatory authorities. In our setting, we nd
the biggest decline in usage of Orbitz and Expedia is among users who view aggregators
as close substitutes, indicating our results might apply to settings where there are multiple
aggregators and users can easily substitute between them. The ndings might look very
dierent in a category where there is only one dominant aggregator (e.g. Amazon in the
online retail setting) or where there are numerous rms (e.g. the hotel industry). Even in
such cases individual rms might have dierent degrees of market power. We hope future
research will analyze more cases to understand the market power relationship in dierent
contexts.
This paper examines a short-run eect, constrained by the dispute which lasted ve
months. Long-run eects might be very dierent and might lead to higher equilibrium
prices. It might also lead to changes in airlines' marketing strategy if they choose to no
longer be part of an aggregator, as airlines have to work harder to increase their probability
of discovery.
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A Search Estimates: Alternative Control Groups
Table 22: Site visits to aa.com unchanged during the dispute period: Results robust to
three dierent analyses
sites duration pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
(1) before-after analysis
Jan-May 0 0.017 1.89 0.126 1.25 0.714 5.27
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.016 1.10 0.104 0.57 -0.618 -2.20
N obs 258,201
N id 82,886
(2) di-in-di (unlikely competitors, Airtran & AlaskaAir, as controls)
Jan-May 0 0.006 1.95 -0.004 -0.10 0.082 1.99
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.009 1.47 0.161 1.86 0.195 1.22
Jan-May X AA F0 0.003 0.41 0.073 0.81 0.514 4.36
Jan-May X Dispute X AA F1 0.006 0.44 -0.046 -0.28 -0.657 -2.72
N obs 774,603
N id 82,886
(3) di-in-di (LonelyPlanet as control)
Dispute 0 0.010 3.56 0.046 1.59 0.104 2.64
Dispute X Treatment 1 -0.004 -0.79 0.025 0.53 -0.059 -0.88
Dispute X AA F0 0.002 0.27 0.051 0.61 0.513 4.49
Dispute X Treatment X AA F1 0.016 1.36 0.019 0.13 -0.517 -2.39
N obs 525,300
N id 83,991
(3) di-in-di analysis (exclude treated websites from control)
Jan-May 0 0.015 5.44 0.106 4.41 0.158 5.90
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.005 -1.25 -0.007 -0.17 -0.089 -1.73
Jan-May X AA F0 0.000 0.03 0.034 0.40 0.469 4.04
Jan-May X Dispute X AA F1 0.018 1.47 0.044 0.29 -0.432 -1.95
N obs 3,873,015
N id 82,886
(4) di-in-di analysis (original)
Jan-May 0 0.022 7.22 0.186 6.87 0.228 8.39
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.009 -1.87 -0.054 -1.22 -0.095 -1.92
Jan-May X AA F0 -0.006 -0.81 -0.034 -0.40 0.407 3.51
Jan-May X Dispute X AA F1 0.023 1.90 0.090 0.59 -0.428 -1.94
N obs 4,389,417
N id 82,886
Fixed eects machine id
Cluster machine id
Note: (1) presents a before-after analysis for visits to the domain aa.com. (2) presents a di-in-di
analysis comparing searches of those who browsed American airlines to those who browsed unlikely
competitors Alaska and AirTran. (3) presents a di-in-di analysis using visits to LonelyPlanet as a
control. (4) presents a di-in-di analysis using all competitors (airlines and aggregators) except the
treated rms as controls. (5) presents a di-in-di analysis using all competitors as controls. Each table
presents 3 separate regressions run for each of the 3 dependant variables - sites, duration and pages. 1
in (1) and F1 in (2),(3), (4) and (5) are the relevant treatment eects.
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Table 23: Site visits to orbitz.com drop during the dispute period: Results robust to
three dierent analyses
sites duration pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
(1) before-after analysis
Jan-May 0 0.056 5.12 0.386 3.18 0.397 4.61
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.035 -1.91 -0.321 -1.99 -0.103 -0.78
N obs 258,201
N id 82,886
(2) di-in-di (unlikely competitors, Kayak & Cheapights, as controls)
Jan-May 0 0.021 5.64 0.112 3.02 0.106 4.21
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.008 -1.24 -0.041 -0.67 0.008 0.19
Jan-May X Or F0 0.025 2.76 0.228 2.58 0.210 2.88
Jan-May X Dispute X Or F1 -0.031 -1.82 -0.294 -2.27 -0.082 -0.73
N obs 774,603
N id 82,886
(3) di-in-di (LonelyPlanet as control)
Dispute 0.013 3.84 0.059 1.98 0.074 2.65
Dispute X Treatment -0.001 -0.15 -0.007 -0.15 -0.019 -0.49
Dispute X AA 0.032 3.51 0.261 2.98 0.236 3.26
Dispute X Treatment X AA -0.038 -2.19 -0.314 -2.47 -0.057 -0.52
N obs 525,300
N id 83,991
(3) di-in-di analysis (exclude treated websites from control)
Jan-May 0 0.015 5.53 0.109 4.47 0.156 5.83
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.005 -1.16 -0.013 -0.30 -0.086 -1.68
Jan-May X Or F0 0.031 3.48 0.249 2.87 0.187 2.58
Jan-May X Dispute X Or F1 -0.038 -2.24 -0.296 -2.35 0.036 0.32
N obs 3,873,015
N id 82,886
(4) di-in-di analysis (original)
Jan-May 0 0.021 6.87 0.173 6.63 0.246 8.97
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.006 -1.21 -0.033 -0.75 -0.124 -2.43
Jan-May X Or F0 0.027 3.06 0.194 2.24 0.107 1.49
Jan-May X Dispute X Or F1 -0.036 -2.18 -0.272 -2.17 0.070 0.62
N obs 4,389,417
N id 82,886
Fixed eects machine id
Cluster machine id
Note: (1) presents a before-after analysis for visits to the domain orbitz.com. (2) presents a di-in-di
analysis comparing searches of those who browsed Orbitz to those who browsed unlikely competitors
Kayak and Cheapights. (3) presents a di-in-di analysis using visits to LonelyPlanet as a control. (4)
presents a di-in-di analysis using all competitors (airlines and aggregators) except the treated rms
as controls. (5) presents a di-in-di analysis using all competitors as controls. Each table presents 3
separate regressions run for each of the 3 dependant variables - sites, duration and pages. 1 in (1) and
F1 in (2),(3), (4) and (5) are the relevant treatment eects.
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Table 24: Site visits to expedia.com drop during the dispute period: Results robust to
three dierent analyses
sites duration pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
(1) before-after analysis
Jan-May 0 0.100 6.51 1.119 8.25 1.043 9.12
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.037 -1.52 -0.453 -2.15 -0.177 -0.99
N obs 258,201
N id 82,886
(2) di-in-di (unlikely competitors, Kayak & Cheapights, as controls)
Jan-May 0 0.023 5.45 0.155 3.73 0.116 3.78
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.005 -0.64 -0.039 -0.57 0.032 0.67
Jan-May X Ex F0 0.063 5.17 0.833 7.61 0.826 8.66
Jan-May X Dispute X Ex F1 -0.044 -2.15 -0.431 -2.48 -0.229 -1.53
N obs 774,603
N id 82,886
(3) di-in-di (LonelyPlanet as control)
Dispute 0.015 3.51 0.111 2.78 0.078 2.09
Dispute X Treatment 0.005 0.60 0.006 0.10 0.026 0.50
Dispute X AA 0.069 5.56 0.850 7.74 0.837 8.77
Dispute X Treatment X AA -0.048 -2.36 -0.438 -2.53 -0.193 -1.31
N obs 525,300
N id 83,991
(3) di-in-di analysis (exclude treated websites from control)
Jan-May 0 0.016 5.52 0.118 4.73 0.158 5.83
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.004 -0.97 -0.012 -0.29 -0.081 -1.58
Jan-May X Ex F0 0.069 5.70 0.854 7.88 0.803 8.48
Jan-May X Dispute X Ex F1 -0.050 -2.50 -0.433 -2.53 -0.110 -0.74
N obs 3,873,015
N id 82,886
(4) di-in-di analysis (original)
Jan-May 0 0.018 6.30 0.135 5.29 0.207 7.69
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.005 -1.08 -0.024 -0.57 -0.115 -2.28
Jan-May X Ex F0 0.067 5.60 0.836 7.74 0.762 8.07
Jan-May X Dispute X Ex F1 -0.049 -2.48 -0.417 -2.45 -0.085 -0.57
N obs 4,389,417
N id 82,886
Fixed eects machine id
Cluster machine id
Note: (1) presents a before-after analysis for visits to the domain expedia.com. (2) presents a di-in-di
analysis comparing searches of those who browsed Orbitz to those who browsed unlikely competitors
Kayak and Cheapights. (3) presents a di-in-di analysis using visits to LonelyPlanet as a control. (4)
presents a di-in-di analysis using all competitors (airlines and aggregators) except the treated rms
as controls. (5) presents a di-in-di analysis using all competitors as controls. Each table presents 3
separate regressions run for each of the 3 dependant variables - sites, duration and pages. 1 in (1) and
F1 in (2),(3), (4) and (5) are the relevant treatment eects.
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B Search Estimates: Robustness Checks
Table 25: Using only last 1 month as relevant to the (intended) purchase
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
(1) sites
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.094 9.93 0.091 9.70 0.090 9.66
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.002 0.11 0.008 0.46 0.007 0.39
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.011 -1.35 0.044 4.77 0.048 3.76
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.033 2.45 -0.075 -5.19 -0.054 -2.92
(2) duration
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 1.873 19.90 1.841 19.76 1.808 19.67
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.170 0.92 0.219 1.19 0.220 1.21
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.016 0.12 0.552 4.62 1.121 6.02
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.133 0.63 -0.696 -3.57 -0.719 -2.69
(3) pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 1.463 17.94 1.476 17.94 1.444 17.61
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.167 -1.16 -0.180 -1.24 -0.171 -1.19
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.595 3.40 0.362 3.49 0.911 6.45
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 -0.538 -2.34 -0.311 -1.87 -0.463 -2.45
N obs 1,746,223
N id 82,886
Fixed eects id, year, year X focal
Cluster id
Note: Tables present di-in-di analyses using all competitors as controls for each of the three
dependant variables (1) sites, (2) duration and (3) pages. Only the last month of search is
used. Each table presents 3 separate regressions run for each of the impacted domains, aa.com,
orbitz.com and expedia.com. Jan-May is an indicator for the ve months January-May, Dispute
is an indicator for the year of the dispute 2011, Focal is an indicator for the impacted domain F1
is the relevant treatment eect.
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Table 26: Using only last 2 months as relevant to the (intended) purchase
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
(1) sites
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.049 12.30 0.046 11.93 0.046 11.93
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.011 -1.43 -0.005 -0.73 -0.006 -0.81
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.018 -2.15 0.026 3.01 0.037 3.45
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.031 2.50 -0.058 -4.07 -0.050 -2.81
(2) duration
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.685 17.35 0.659 17.01 0.631 16.77
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.133 -1.92 -0.094 -1.39 -0.095 -1.42
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.060 -0.59 0.373 4.18 0.859 6.39
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.107 0.67 -0.556 -3.89 -0.546 -2.66
(3) pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.594 17.14 0.602 17.31 0.568 16.68
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.208 -3.64 -0.224 -3.95 -0.214 -3.81
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.369 2.58 0.217 2.63 0.803 7.13
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 -0.433 -2.27 -0.159 -1.27 -0.332 -2.11
N obs 2,747,574
N id 82,886
Fixed eects id, year, year X focal
Cluster id
Note: Tables present di-in-di analyses using all competitors as controls for each of the three depen-
dant variables (1) sites, (2) duration and (3) pages. Only the last two months of searches are used.
Each table presents 3 separate regressions run for each of the impacted domains, aa.com, orbitz.com
and expedia.com. Jan-May is an indicator for the ve months January-May, Dispute is an indicator
for the year of the dispute 2011, Focal is an indicator for the impacted domain F1 is the relevant
treatment eect.
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Table 27: Remove outliers
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
(1) sites
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.022 7.32 0.020 6.92 0.018 6.36
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.009 -1.92 -0.006 -1.21 -0.005 -1.09
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.008 -1.13 0.027 3.12 0.066 5.50
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.026 2.27 -0.036 -2.20 -0.049 -2.47
(2) durn
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.154 7.47 0.137 6.92 0.110 5.79
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.052 -1.49 -0.025 -0.73 -0.023 -0.70
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.097 -1.69 0.190 3.23 0.646 8.03
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.193 2.02 -0.269 -2.94 -0.302 -2.28
(3) pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.179 8.81 0.187 9.35 0.156 7.94
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.076 -2.16 -0.091 -2.59 -0.084 -2.42
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.248 3.84 0.121 2.16 0.642 9.37
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 -0.181 -1.55 0.075 0.86 -0.049 -0.42
N obs 4,354,193
N id 82,762
Fixed eects id, year, year X focal
Cluster id
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Table 28: Searches on impacted domains, relative to competitors and pooled control period
assuming the dispute lasted 3 months
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
(1) sites
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.026 7.98 0.024 7.76 0.021 6.97
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.005 -1.05 -0.003 -0.65 -0.002 -0.44
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.012 -1.59 0.018 2.01 0.071 6.01
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 0.010 0.82 -0.028 -1.92 -0.047 -2.39
(2) durn
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.199 7.06 0.186 6.84 0.151 5.76
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.064 -1.36 -0.053 -1.15 -0.047 -1.06
Jan-May X Focal F0 -0.020 -0.22 0.203 2.34 0.792 6.88
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 -0.063 -0.42 -0.250 -1.98 -0.353 -1.88
(3) pages
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.221 8.51 0.239 9.12 0.212 8.28
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.082 -1.79 -0.125 -2.66 -0.126 -2.76
Jan-May X Focal F0 0.414 3.22 0.107 1.38 0.576 5.76
Jan-May X Dispute X Focal F1 -0.635 -2.90 0.105 0.91 0.118 0.72
N obs 4,389,417
N id 82,886
Fixed eects id, year, year X focal
Cluster id
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Table 29: Site visits for consumers living near airports with varying degrees
of American presence: di analysis
(1) No American Airlines serving nearby airports
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 -0.022 -0.69 0.160 1.42 0.318 1.34
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.010 0.13 -0.064 -0.44 -0.308 -1.22
N obs 1,203
N 469
(2) American is most important airline in nearest airport
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.032 1.42 0.024 0.76 0.057 1.97
Jan-May X Dispute 1 -0.016 -0.44 0.043 0.92 0.005 0.12
N obs 60,899
N 20,248
(3) Airport is neither American-absent or American-important
aa.com orbitz.com expedia.com
coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.012 1.31 0.071 6.56 0.119 6.47





coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.017 1.89 0.056 5.12 0.100 6.51
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.016 1.1 -0.035 -1.91 -0.037 -1.52
N obs 258,201
N 82,886
Note: This table presents a di analysis for visits to the treated domains for three
subsets of the data, 1) airports with No American presence, 2) Airports where American
is the most important airline and 3) the rest. The hypothesis is that we will see the
strongest eect of the dispute in susbet (3), because this is where the role of aggregators
is most relevant. For reference, analysis using All data is also presented. 1 is the
relevant treatment eect.
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coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.123 1.99 0.074 0.76 0.102 1.43





coe t-stat coe t-stat coe t-stat
Jan-May 0 0.015 1.27 0.064 3.57 0.117 4.72
Jan-May X Dispute 1 0.036 1.4 -0.075 -3.04 -0.067 -1.67
N obs 62,628
N 19,312
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